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Abstract —  As the number and size of the Network 
and Internet traffic increase and the need for the intrusion 
detection grows in step to reduce the overhead required 
for the intrusion detection and diagnosis, it has made 
public servers increasingly vulnerable to unauthorized 
accesses and incursion of intrusions[2]. In addition to 
maintaining low latency and poor performance for the 
client, filtering unauthorized accesses has become one of 
the major concerns of a server administrator.  
 
Hence implementation of an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) [2] distinguishes between the traffic coming 
from clients and the traffic originated from the attackers 
or intruders, in an attempt to simultaneously mitigate the 
problems of throughput, latency and security of the 
network. We then present the results of a series of load and 
response time in the terms of performance and scalability 
tests, and suggest a number of potential uses for such a 
system. 
 
The exponential growth of computer/network 
attacks are becoming more and more difficult to identify 
and the need for better and more efficient intrusion 
detection systems increases in step. The main problem with 
current intrusion detection systems is high rate of  false 
alarms. Use of honeypots [1] provides effective solution to 
increase the security and reliability of the network.  
 
Keywords - Intrusion Detection Ssystem; Advanced 
Honeypots;Computer Attcks; Network Security;Information 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
We  present the design and implementation   of   a   load   
balancer   that distinguishes between the traffic coming from 
clients and the traffic originated from the attackers. This 
system is an attempt to simultaneously solve the problems of 
load balancing [3] and unauthorized intrusion. 
 If, in  the  process  of  forwarding  requests,  the 
balancer  detects traffic as  an attack  on the server  (‘an  
exploit’),  it  is  then directed  to an alternative server - a type 
of honeypot.  Conventional detection  and forensics 
methodology  can  then  be  used  to  gather information  on  
the  intruder  who  will  be unaware  that  they  are  not  using  
a  “real” server.   Thus,   the   system   will   not   only protect
 mission critical  servers from unauthorized 
access in a manner transparent   to   the   user,   but   
allow   for detailed data to be collected, which can later   be   
used   to   take   appropriate   legal action against the 
incursion of intruders. 
 
II. BACKGROUND ON IDS 
 
 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) inspects all inbound and 
outbound network activity and identifies suspicious patterns 
that may indicate a network or system attack from someone 
attempting to break into or compromise a system.  
There are several ways to categorize an IDS:  
A. Misuse detection vs. anomaly detection: in misuse 
detection, the IDS analyzes the information it gathers and 
compares it to large databases of attack signatures. Essentially, 
the IDS looks for a specific attack that has already been 
documented. Like a virus detection system, misuse detection 
software is only as good as the database of attack signatures 
that it uses to compare packets against. In anomaly detection, 
the system administrator defines the baseline, or normal, state 
of the network’s traffic load, breakdown, protocol, and typical 
packet size. The anomaly detector monitors network[12] 
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segments to compare their state to the normal baseline and 
look for anomalies.  
B. Network-based vs. host-based systems: in a 
network-based system, or NIDS, the individual packets 
flowing through a network are analyzed. The NIDS can detect 
malicious packets that are designed to be overlooked by a 
firewall’s simplistic filtering rules. In a host-based system, the 
IDS examines at the activity on each individual computer or 
host.  
C. Passive system vs. reactive system: in a passive 
system, the IDS detects a potential security breach, logs the 
information and signals an alert. In a reactive system, the IDS 
responds to the suspicious activity by logging off a user or by 
reprogramming the firewall to block network traffic from the 
suspected malicious source. 
Though they both relate to network security, an IDS differs 
from a firewall in that a firewall looks out for intrusions in 
order to stop them from happening. The firewall limits the 
access between networks in order to prevent intrusion and 
does not signal an attack from inside the network. An IDS 
evaluates a suspected intrusion once it has taken place and 
signals an alarm. An IDS also watches for attacks that 
originate from within a system.  
 
Figure 1: Intrusion Detection System hierarchy  
 
 
 IV. NETWORK   INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
(NIDS) 
 
Recent years have seen a drastic increase in   the   
popularity   of   Network   Intrusion Detection systems 
(NIDS). Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be 
classified into two categories: Network-based Intrusion 
Detection Systems (NIDS) and Host-based Intrusion 
Detection Systems (HIDS).  Existing products have 
substantial network monitoring   capacity,   and   have 
been largely successful at providing accurate reports on 
unauthorized activity. While  these  products  have  gotten  
fairly good   at   monitoring   and   reporting   on unusual 
activity, it has been stated, that the biggest problem with 
IDS  is “intelligently reacting  to  their  output”.  
 
 If  an  IDS detects  an  attack  in  progress,  what  action 
should  be  taken?. Furthermore,  even  if the organization 
deploying the IDS has the foresight create an attack response 
plan, if an  administrator  receives  a  page  at  4:00 am, what 
are the chances that s/he will be able to react quickly enough 
to prevent the intrusion?   Under most existing systems 
chances   for   timely   prevention   of   the intrusion   highly   
depend   on   the   quick reaction of the human administrator.
 All too often IDS logs are only consulted long 
after the damage from an attack has been done. 
 
 
III. BACKGROUND ON HONEYPOTS  
 
 
A honeypot is “an information system resource 
whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that 
resource”[1].  
 
A Honeypot is defined as “being a security resource 
whose value lies in being probed or compromised" [1]. They 
can be either host and/or network based, but are more often 
than not network based as all interaction is typically 
performed over a network connection. A honeypot's main 
utility comes from the fact that it simplifies the Intrusion 
Detection problem of separating “anomalous" from “normal" 
by having no legitimate purpose, thus any activity on a 
Honeypot can be immediately defined as anomalous. The 
characteristics of Honeypots make them well suited to the 
monitoring of malcious activity on networks, as well as being 
a valuable research tool in Computer Security. 
 Honeypot concepts are not particularly new; they can 
be traced back to early Computer Security papers such as 
Cliaord Stoll's Stalking the Wily Hacker [2]. However the 
study of Honeypots has recently been formalized. With this 
formalization has come a focus on research of attackers' 
methods and motivations [3] which has led to Honeypots 
being instrumental in the discovery of new security 
vulnerabilities [4]. 
 
 
 
IV. SOURCE DIRECT  
 
Secure Direct  is  an attempt to  address  this problem:  
by  providing  a  fully  automated response to  specific network  
intrusions,  it can eliminate the need for human decision 
making,   and   thus   mitigate  slow   human response   times.    
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Figure2.  Taxonomy of Honeypot 
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V. ARCHITECTURE OF IDS USING ADVANCED 
HONYPOT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Architecture of IDS using Advanced Honypot 
 
 
The activity at each process in the above diagram can be 
described as follows: 
 
1.   The load balancer [3] receives the request to the virtual 
IP address. If the packet containing the request 
has been fragmented, it is reassembled. 
2.   The   Load   balancer   opens   a   TCP connection  to  
the  IDS  Process,  and sends  the  content  of  the  packet  
(less the headers) over that connection. 
3.   The IDS process checks the content of the   packet   
against   its   database   of known  attacks,  and  returns  a  
Boolean result  to  the  load  balancer  over  the same 
TCP connection. 
4.   On   receiving   the   result,   the   load balancer closes 
the TCP connection. If the result from the IDS was “true” 
(Indicating the presence of  an  attack) the packet is  
forwarded to the Honeypot. Otherwise, a   server   
is selected from the active server pool in a round-robin  
fashion  and  the  packet is forwarded to the server. 
 
 The design   of   this system entailed 
overcoming a number of challenges. What these challenges 
were, and how they were addressed  is discussed in the 
remainder of this section. 
 
Honeypots are a highly flexible security tool with 
different applications for security. They don't fix a single 
problem. Instead they have multiple uses, such as prevention, 
detection, or information gathering. Honeypots all share the 
same concept, a security resource that should not have any 
production or authorized activity. In other words, deployment 
of honeypots in a network should not affect critical network 
services and applications. A honeypot is a security resource 
whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised. 
There are two general types of honeypots: Production 
honeypots are easy to use, capture only limited information, 
and are used primarily by companies or corporations; and 
Research honeypots are complex to deploy and maintain, 
capture extensive information, and are used primarily by 
research, military, or government organizations.  
 
http://www.honeypots.net Honeypots are increasingly 
used to provide early warning of potential intruders, identify 
flaws in security strategies, and improve an organization's 
overall security awareness. “Honeypots can simulate a variety 
of internal and external devices, including Web servers, mail 
servers, database servers, application servers, and even 
firewalls. As a software development manager, I regularly use 
honeypots to gain insight into vulnerabilities in both the 
software my team writes and the OS upon which we depend.” 
 
http://www.windowsitpro.com/Windows/Article/Arti
cleID/44711/44711.html A honeypot is a security resource 
whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised. 
This means that whatever we designate as a honeypot, it is our 
expectation and goal to have the system probed, attacked, and 
potentially exploited. A honeypot also is a detection and 
response tool, rather than prevention which it has a little value 
in. (http://www.securitydocs.com/library/2692) A better way 
to think of a honeypot is as an Internet-attached server that 
acts as a decoy, luring in potential hackers in order to study 
their activities and monitor how they are able to break into a 
system.  
Honeypots are designed to mimic systems that an 
intruder would like to break into but limit the intruder from 
having access to an entire network. If a honeypot is successful, 
the intruder will have no idea that s/he is being tricked and 
monitored. Most honeypots are installed inside firewalls so 
that they can better be controlled, though it is possible to 
install them outside of firewalls. A firewall in a honeypot 
works in the opposite way that a normal firewall works: 
instead of restricting what comes into a system from the 
Internet, the honeypot firewall allows all traffic to come in 
from the Internet and restricts what the system sends back out. 
By luring a hacker into a system, a honeypot serves several 
purposes: The administrator can watch the hacker exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the system, thereby learning where the 
system has weaknesses that need to be redesigned. The hacker 
can be caught and stopped while trying to obtain root access to 
the system.By studying the activities of hackers, designers can 
better create more secure systems that are potentially 
invulnerable to future hackers. 
(http://www.securitydocs.com/library/2692) 
 
 
VI.  LOAD BALANCING 
 
  In designing a load balancer [3]  for Secure 
Direct we  have three main  focuses, namely,  to  provide  
Load 
Balancer  
Original 
Sever 
Honey 
pot 
Intrusion 
Detection 
System
Incoming 
Traffic
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High-Availability  by handling hardware  failure in 
the web-cluster, maintain high speed access to the  cluster,  
and  ensure  the  balancer  itself does  not  become  a  
security  hole. High availability is achieved by simply 
pinging the servers at   regular intervals, and 
removing them from the server pool if no response is 
received. 
 The second challenge is to secure the load balancer.  
Our strategy is   to protect it from any irrelevant traffic. Only 
traffic to a specific  port   on  the   virtual  IP  will  be 
processed  by  the  load  balancer  and  any other  malicious  
access  is  simply  ignored. The load balancer uses a 
technique known as ‘Proxy-ARP’   to respond to ARP 
requests from the router to the virtual IP address. 
 
 The   web   servers   have   their   loop back 
interface3   configured  with  the  virtual  IP address,  but  are  
set  not  to  respond  to  ARP packets. This, at the 
network layer, there is   no   way   to   tell   which   servers   
are configured with the virtual IP. 
 
The load balancer process is implemented as a multi-
threaded process in Java.  The main thread  is  responsible  for  
reading  packets off  the  wire  and  if  they  are  destined  to 
virtual IP and  their  destination port  is  our desired  service  
port,  it  hands  them  to  the control  thread.   The   control 
thread   then communicates with the IDS process and decides  
to pass the packet to the production   servers   or   direct   it   to   
the Honeypot.   
 
 In case  of  TCP   applications, after 
redirecting a request to a server, the load balancer process 
should  hold the information about  which request   
is forwarded   to   which   server   in   order   to forward   all   
of   the   ACK   packets   in   a particular  session.  We 
keep the information about each connection in a table. As the 
load balancer only passes the traffic from client to server, it 
is unable to see  the  last  FIN  sent  by  the  server,  and 
therefore  there  is  no  way  that  the  load balancer can find 
out when  the conversation  between  two  hosts  is  
over. Therefore we define a time stamp for each connection. 
Each time a packet is received on a connection its time stamp 
is updated. The connections will be removed from the table 
if its time stamp is not updated for a certain amount of time 
(which has been set at arbitrarily at 4 minutes during our 
tests). 
 
VII.  INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
Internally, the implementation of the IDS portion of Secure 
Direct is   very simple. The IDS process runs as a concurrent 
TCP server, and listens for client requests on a specified   port.
 When   a   connection   is made, the IDS fork a child 
process when receives the content of the packet, and then 
checks it against a database of known attacks. 
 It  then  returns  the  result  of  this check to the  load  
balancer  process,  which makes the decision on whether to 
forward the request to the production server cluster, or  the  
Honeypot.  
 
The   multithreaded   design   of   the   load balancer   
ensures   that   multiple   requests from a client will not get 
‘mixed up’; however, it is possible that an attack would occur 
from a single IP at the same time as a valid  request.  In  this  
case,  the  initial, harmless packets may be safely forwarded to  
the  real  servers  until  the  IDS  process finds   the   attack-
packet   and   detects   the signs of intrusion. At this point,
 it immediately   informs   the   load   balancer process  
to discontinue  forwarding  packets to  the  real  server,  and  
to  send  an  RST packet  to  the  corresponding  server  to  end 
the connection. Thus, the server will never receive the attack.  
In the attacker side, observing   silence   from   the   server   
side causes it to assume the server has crashed and possibly 
causes it to try to re-connect. However  from  this  point,  after  
detecting the intrusion, all the incoming traffic from the  
attacker's  IP  will  be  forwarded  to  the Honeypot. 
 
One of the key points in maintaining speed of   this   
system   is   that,   once   an   IP   is recognized   as   an   
Attacker   IP,   packets coming from that source are not 
passed to the   IDS   process   any   more.   The   load 
balancer   process   directs   the   incoming traffic from 
attackers to the Honeypot. 
 
VIII.  THE TCP LAYER 
 
 Secure Direct is implemented for applications   
that   use   TCP/IP   as   their transport protocol. Secure 
Direct   is designed  (like  any good  security product) to   be   
failed-closed  system,   which means if it crashes, it is no 
longer possible to  access  either  web  server  through  the 
virtual  IP.  Consequently the attackers can not   crash   
Secure Direct   and   access   the unprotected system. 
 
 One of the major challenges  for 
Secure Direct is to deal with attackers who try  to  fool  the  
system  by  forcing  it  to analyze the packets inconsistent with 
what is received in the end-system. In the cases that the 
intrusion detection system runs at the different host-OS than 
the end-system, this can be a serious concern. The attacker can 
take advantage of differences between the IDS and the end-
system in dealing with the packets that do not fully comply 
with the   standard   protocols,   and   send   some packets that 
are discarded by the end-host but accepted by the IDS, or vice 
versa.  If Secure Direct uses  TCP/IP, the 
inconsistency  between  the  IDS  and  the end-host  may  
appear  in  IP  level  or  TCP level [5]. TCP protocol uses 
sequence numbers to preserve the order of the incoming 
packets. The end-system waits until it receives all the 
sequence numbers required  for re-assembling   the   data.   
If   there   is   a missing  sequence  number,  the  end-system 
will not accept the consequent packets and waits  until  it  
receives  the  packet  with  the sequence  number 
it is  waiting for. Therefore one way to try to fool the 
system is   to   send   two   packets   with   the   same sequence  
numbers,   one  containing   false data   to   be   accepted   by   
the   IDS   and discarded  by  the  end-host,  and  the  other one 
containing the attackers desired data to be  accepted  by  the  
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end  host,  and  skipped by the IDS. Thus, whenever it detects 
two different  packets  with  the  same  sequence number  (and  
a  sane  checksum)  for  one connection, it considers it as an 
attack and prevents  the  load  balancer  from  sending that 
packet to the end-host. Furthermore it marks  the  source  IP  
of  this  packet,  as  an attacker  IP,  causing  the  load  
balancer  to forward all the consequent  packets   
originated from this IP to the Honeypot. 
 
 An   alternative   way   to   break   into   the system 
is using IP fragmentation, hoping that   IDS   and   the   
end-host   follow   two different   methods   for   re-
assembling   IP fragments.   Secure Direct however 
re-assembles the IP fragmented packets in the  load   
balancer and forwards the assembled       packet to 
the end-host. Therefore what IDS analyzes is 
completely consistent with what end-host sees. This type 
of implementation should drastically reduce the chances 
of an attacker breaking into the system. 
 
 
IX.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
I chose Windows 2003 Server and professional 
systems with a 2.0GHz processor and  512 MB of RAM with a  
CDROM drive. Windows 20003 was the best choice to since it 
can be secured the most from the operating systems I had 
available to chose from, Windows XP, Windows 2000 Server 
and Windows 2003 Professional. .To archives the findings for 
evidence if needed and also to see if a pattern would develop 
over time to the probability of an attack and what type of 
attack. 
 
The experimental results we describe the detail of this 
experiment conducted with network simulator NS2 and 
configuration of a system 3.0GHz processor and 512 MB 
of RAM. 
  
 TEST ENVIRONMENT 
 
A   simple   test   environment   requires   a minimum of 3 
servers and 4 IP addresses. Each server is assigned a single 
IP address for  basic  TCP/IP  connectivity,  while  the fourth 
is used as a virtual IP, which will be accessed  by  clients,  
and  balanced  by  the balancer   to   either   of   the   two   
servers depending  on  the  contents  of  the  client request.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Test Network Environment  
 
Some intrusion correlation systems do not use a raw 
data stream (like network or audit data) as input, but instead 
rely upon alerts and aggregated information reports from IDSs 
and other sensors [20, 21]. We need to develop systems that 
can generate realistic alert log files for testing correlation 
systems. A solution is to deploy real sensors and to “sanitize” 
the resulting alert stream by replacing IP addresses. 
Sanitization in general is difficult for network activity traces 
but it is relatively easy in this special case since alert streams 
use well defined formats and generally contain little sensitive 
data (the exception being IP addresses and possibly 
passwords). Alternately, some statistical techniques for 
generating synthetic alert datasets from scratch are presented 
by [16]. 
 
IDS testing efforts vary significantly in their depth, 
scope, methodology, and focus. The characteristics of some of 
the more developed efforts listed in chronological order. This 
demonstrates that evaluations have increased in complexity 
over time to include more IDSs and more attack types, such as 
stealthy and denial of service (DoS) attacks. Only research 
evaluations have included novel attacks designed specifically 
for the evaluation, evaluated the performance of anomaly 
detection systems, and generated curves. Evaluations of 
commercial systems have included measurements of 
performance under high traffic loads. Traffic loads were 
generated using real high-volume background traffic mirrored 
from a live network and also with commercial load testing 
tools. The remainder of this section provides details 
concerning all the evaluations, as well as for a few other more 
limited evaluations. Evaluations of research systems are 
described first, followed by descriptions of  commercial 
system evaluations. 
 
The  load   balancer   itself   doesn't   gather   any 
information  internally,  the  addition  of  a Network Based 
Intrusion Detection System  (NIDS)  on  the  network  can  
be used   to   perform   this   task,   while   the intruder is 
harmlessly attacking the Honeypot server. 
 
However, some difficulties exist when using this 
approach:  
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1. Sanitization attempts may end up removing much 
of the content of the background activity thus creating a very 
unrealistic environment. 
 
2. Sanitization attempts may fail causing an 
accidental release of sensitive data. This scenario is very 
possible since it is infeasible for a human to verify the 
sanitization of a large volume of data. We feel that this risk is 
one that most organizations will not tolerate for the sake of a 
research project. 
 
3. Since attacks have to be injected somewhat 
artificially into the sanitized data stream (regardless of the 
method used), the attacks will not realistically interact with the 
background activity. For example, buffer overflow attacks 
may be launched against a web server and cause the server to 
crash, but normal background requests to the web server may 
continue. This lack of interaction between the attacks and the 
background activity could be a problem when 
testing IDSs. 
 
4. When sanitizing real traffic, it may be difficult to 
remove attacks that existed in the data stream. If one is merely 
testing hit rates, then having unidentified attacks in the data is 
an inconvenience but not a major problem. However, having 
unidentified attacks in the background activity would pose a 
problem for any false positive testing. Further, sanitizing data 
may remove information needed to detect attacks. 
 
 RESULTS 
 
 While the basic functionality of a  
content-based  load  balancer  is  relatively easy  to  achieve,  
such  a  system  is  only useful to the extent that it is scaleable 
and stable under  load. At a modest load, the balancer showed 
very stable performance: 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this work, we have described some of the previous 
efforts to measure IDS, and we have outlined some of the 
difficulties that have been encountered. We believe that a 
periodic, comprehensive evaluation of IDSs could be valuable 
for network managers, information security officers and data 
managers. However, because both normal and attack traffic 
are so variable from site to site, and because normal and attack 
traffic evolve over time 
Solving the problem of high availability and security 
simultaneously offers the opportunity for more reliability than 
systems which solve the problems separately, in addition to 
being easier to implement, and offering increased opportunity 
for recording and data analysis. 
The integration of these two technologies, however, 
is a non-trivial task. A fine balance must be achieved between 
speed and robustness of IDS features – it is equally bad to 
have the web server crash because an attack was missed, or 
drop large amounts of traffic due to an overly through IDS 
becoming a bottleneck. Additionally, while a content-based 
load balancer offers many advantages over separate Load 
Balancing and IDS solutions, it also suffers from the 
drawbacks of both. 
It has been said that the three things most important 
to a server manger are Security (the ability to withstand 
hacking), High-Availability (the ability to withstand hardware 
failure), and low-latency (the ability to service requests 
quickly). With the current implementation of secure direct, the 
first two criteria, security and high availability, are satisfied. In 
regards to latency, our experiments have (once again) shown 
that there is a trade-off between security and performance. 
While improving the efficiency of the programming can 
mitigate this problem to an extent, the trade-off is certain to 
remain, and choosing the right balance will likely continue to 
be a difficult task for the system administrator. It is the 
authors’ opinion that this type of system could provide a much 
needed additional security tool, however, a good deal of 
streamlining work remains before it could be widely deployed. 
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